THE LANGUAGE OF RECORD: FINDING AND REMEDYING PREJUDICIAL VIOLATIONS OF LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENT INDIVIDUALS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS BY ANNA C. EVERETT
In immigration court proceedings, court interpreters interpret only those statements made directly to and by the limited English proficient (“LEP”) party. Thus, LEP individuals can only understand what is being spoken to them, not what is being asserted about them. In asylum interviews, applicants must provide their own interpreter, and failure to do so may result in an applicant-caused delay and, ultimately, a denial of work authorization. In immigration proceedings, the LEP party’s livelihood, family unity, and freedom from persecution and death are at stake. The message that the U.S. legal system makes clear is that it does not value clear communication with LEP noncitizens. Instead, LEP noncitizens’ fates will be decided without their informed input.
This Note argues that procedural due process is insufficient if LEP noncitizens, in removal proceedings and asylum interviews, do not have a right to speak and be spoken to via capable interpretation. Procedural due process in immigration proceedings should be expanded to guarantee competent, clear, and complete interpretation for LEP noncitizens. Further, when such interpretation is incomplete, unclear, or incompetent, noncitizens must have access to judicial review by asserting that they were prejudiced by this violation of procedural due process. Congress should shift the burden of proving that the noncitizen’s right to procedural due process was upheld to the government.
MITIGATING MISINFORMATION ON SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS: TREATING SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AS A QUID PRO QUO BENEFIT BY MEGHAN E. MCDERMOTT
The rise of misinformation on social media has prompted governments worldwide to enact legislation that may affect every person’s right to freedom of opinion and expression. In the United States, combatting misinformation shares surprising bipartisan support in an ever-divided political landscape. While several proposals have emerged that would strip social media companies of the twenty-five- year-old law that shields them from lawsuits over content, it is unlikely that they would survive the seemingly insurmountable First Amendment scrutiny. Thus, an alternative to combatting misinformation is needed.
In an attempt to provide an alternative, this Note presents a model for mitigating misinformation. By dissecting the concept of misinformation, exploring the ways in which social media platforms can mitigate misinformation, and proposing the use of misinformation labels, this Note suggests using Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act as a quid pro quo benefit to incentivize social media platforms to mitigate misinformation.
EVALUATING NONDEBTOR RELEASES: HOW PURDUE PHARMA EMPHASIZES THE NEED FOR CONGRESS TO RESOLVE THE DECADES-LONG DEBATE BY SARAH MELANSON
In 2019, Purdue Pharma filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) due to an onslaught of lawsuits arising from its alleged contribution to the opioid crisis. The proposed plan of reorganization became notorious for its release of the Sackler family––nondebtors–– from future civil liability relating to opioid litigation. For over 30 years, Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have split on whether the Code allows release of nondebtors. A majority of circuits have recognized that the Code’s grant of broad, discretionary equitable powers authorizes nondebtor releases. The recent emergence of several mass-tort bankruptcies containing nondebtor releases has sparked a movement for Congress to expressly prohibit the practice. This legislation would negatively impact the practice of bankruptcy law by threatening claimants’ potential recovery and increasing the likelihood that corporations who could possibly reorganize through the use of nondebtor releases, will not be able to without their availability. This note argues that Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code––specifically section 524(g)––beyond the asbestos context and explicitly allow for nondebtor releases in the mass-tort context.
INTERNET JURISDICTION AND THE 21st CENTURY: ZIPPO, CALDER, AND THE METAVERSE BY GRETCHEN YELMINI
Internet use in the United States continues to increase at a rate that outpaces the legal system. From reliance on outdated precedent, differing long-arm statutes, and emergent technologies, there are unanswered questions of whether existing precedent is sufficient to handle our increasingly borderless society.
Many courts still rely on the Zippo test despite the exponential advancements in how we use the internet in the twenty-five years since the Western District of Pennsylvania developed a framework for this issue. The Supreme Court has continued to avoid directly addressing the issue. In 2014, the Court left decisions on virtual presence to “another day,” and nearly a decade after that decision, there is no indication that this day is coming anytime soon.
The Court’s avoidance of this issue has led to varying interpretations of whether it is appropriate for courts to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over internet conduct. As a result, some circuits believe that the existing tests are sufficient to address internet-based conduct, while others adhere more rigidly to the Zippo framework. By analyzing defamation across different states and the potential impact of the metaverse, this Note articulates the impact that these differing approaches can have on individuals’ access to justice before proposing solutions to the problem.