Florence T.B. Simon

In March 2023, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its Sixth Assessment Report and confirmed unequivocally that human activities are the cause of climate change. Greenhouse gas emissions over the next few years are capable of causing irreversible and catastrophic damage to our planet. Catalyst litigation plays an important role in tackling climate change by prodding governments to assume a role in implementing adaptation and mitigation measures. Despite the extreme consequences that climate change will have on humanity, jurisdictional issues—such as standing—impose considerable hurdles for climate litigants. And these hurdles ultimately keep plaintiffs from obtaining a ruling, or even a discussion, on the merits of their case. Continue reading →

Casey M. Corvino

Words often carry an intuitive meaning that defies explicit definition. While this vagueness typically poses no issue in our daily lives, it presents distinct challenges within the legal realm where words and their definitions wield the power to influence the course of justice. One abstract concept is notoriously elusive: what is an accident? Despite the apparent simplicity of identifying what is commonly understood implicitly, there are inherent challenges in “giving substance to a concept which is largely intuitive.” Continue reading →

Laura Briggs

In June 2023, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) of 1978 in Haaland v. Brackeen, making it harder for (some) Indigenous families and communities to lose their children. The decision left one key question unanswered, however: whether protections specifically for American Indian households served as an illegitimate “racial” preference. Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s opinion for the majority argued that the petitioners lacked standing to raise this issue. Thus, the Court left the door open to continuing challenges by those who have an interest in using ICWA’s cute children and clean-cut evangelical Christian parents to try to put an end to this and all related statutes that give so-called “preferential treatment” to American Indians—including in gaming compacts, employment, federal treaties, and essentially all of Indian law. Continue reading →

Ian Heath Gershengorn

In this Essay, as I did at the Connecticut Law Review’s Symposium, I draw on my experience representing Tribes in Haaland v. Brackeen to discuss more broadly the effective presentation of tribal arguments to the Court. I touch briefly on four main topics. First, I discuss how we collaborated with amici to ensure that the Court would have the full context as it considered the issues in Brackeen. Second, I discuss how we thought about preparing for the argument and the particular importance of understanding the practical operation of the Indian Child Welfare Act. Third, I offer a few observations on the oral argument itself, focusing on how the structure of the argument influences the substance of the argument. And fourth, I step back and discuss why this is a particularly interesting and challenging time to argue Indian law cases before the Supreme Court. Continue reading →

Casey M. Corvino & Julia R. Vassallo

In October 2023, the Connecticut Law Review hosted the Symposium “Interrogating Haaland v. Brackeen: Family Regulation, Constitutional Power, and Tribal Resilience.” The symposium was centered on the state of federal Indian law in the wake of the Brackeen decision. This decision was a victory for Indigenous families and Native nations as it left the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) unscathed and affirmed the constitutional relationship between tribal nations and the United States. However, threats to tribal sovereignty continue as a handful of states and interest groups continue to seek ways to challenge tribal authority and federal laws that support it. Continue reading →

Seth Davis

There is no nondelegation doctrine for Native nations, nor should there be one even if the Supreme Court revives the nondelegation doctrine for federal agencies and private parties. The Court has never struck down a statute on the ground that it delegated legislative power to a Native nation. Instead, it has held that Congress may recognize the sovereignty of Native nations and that their independent authority sustains statutes that rely upon Native governments to implement policy goals that they share with the United States. Continue reading →

Gregory Ablavsky

In Haaland v. Brackeen, the Supreme Court returned to the foundational question of federal authority over relations between the United States and Native nations, long known as “Indian affairs.” The decision reaffirmed well-established precedent affirming broad federal authority in the area, but it also underscored ongoing disagreement, as Justices Gorsuch and Thomas offered lengthy and dueling investigations of the original understanding.

This Essay explores one aspect of that history: the original meaning of “commerce” in the Indian Commerce Clause. Nearly a decade ago, I wrote an article that sought, as its title indicated, to move “beyond the Indian Commerce Clause.” The Clause, I argued, was only one small component in how the early American political elite understood federal authority in this area. Continue reading →

Andrew Jordan

Many contract theorists argue that contracts are promises. This view is appealing because it can justify the institution of contract law—contract law allows parties to vindicate their promissory rights. But contract-as-promise advocates have seriously misunderstood how promises work. They assume a cartoon version of promises, one that is overly abstract, individualistic, and is singularly fixated on the obligation to do what one promised. Continue reading →

Brad Baranowski

A deluge is coming. The Supreme Court’s two most recent personal jurisdiction cases—Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District and Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railroad—have thrown this area of law into even more flux than before. Because of these cases’ heavy emphasis on the fact-intensive nature of personal jurisdiction law, plaintiffs facing down motions to dismiss based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) are going to start asking an obvious question: If the Supreme Court thinks facts are so important to personal jurisdiction, then should I try to get access to more facts? The result will be more requests to conduct jurisdictional discovery, and more courts having to figure out how to decide those requests. Continue reading →

Lauren Rogal

Neighborhood organizations often advocate for land use policies and decisions that curtail development and entry into the neighborhood. This “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) disposition echoes a long history of exclusionary activity by these organizations and reflects a broader tendency to operate in furtherance of property values and other private interests. Due to substantive and procedural deficiencies in federal tax policy, these organizations often operate as 501(c)(3) tax-exempt charities, a status rightly reserved for organizations that generate broad public benefits. This Article argues for the adoption of clear substantive and procedural rules that restrict charitable status to organizations that either provide tangible benefits to the general public or target their benefits to a materially distressed community. Continue reading →