DANIEL B. ROSENBAUM
County governments occupy an awkward dual position in the sub-federal system. They are both local governments (democratic bodies, akin to cities and towns) and state agents (administrative units of state government, akin to departments and agencies). Neither role seems to suit counties particularly well. When acting as local democratic bodies, counties are constrained by state law and severely under-resourced, especially in contrast with municipal governments in their midst. As administrative agents of the state, moreover, counties are saddled with a cascade of responsibilities that the state has delegated to the regional level, duties they must perform without the same support afforded prototypal state agencies. A county’s dissimilar roles thus share one unifying theme. On paper, as the slim legal literature on county governments has observed, counties are passive, static, and relatively powerless actors in both their local and state manifestations.
This conventional description is incomplete. Counties’ unique intermediary position gives them a function—and therefore, a voice—in a wide variety of intergovernmental activities. Money and property flow through them; federal and state grants are administered by them. By virtue of their static boundaries and ubiquitous statewide presence, counties are tasked with managing public land, collecting and disbursing taxes, and providing services to other local governments. Significant powers are embedded within these responsibilities. Through a myriad of seemingly ministerial duties, counties have quietly become regional brokers who can (and do) wield influence over other local bodies, yielding a county apparatus that is far more muscular in practice than it is in theory.
This Article sheds light on the unheralded power of county governments. It focuses particularly on two entities that operate in a county’s territorial orbit: sheriff’s offices, one of several local officials who are elected directly by residents rather than appointed by county commissions, and library districts, one of a constellation of special-purpose districts that hold autonomous taxing authority in a local region. Sheriffs and library districts formally operate beyond the reach of a county commission’s control. Indeed, their very existence would seem to underscore the institutional weakness of county government. Yet counties’ administrative powers afford them wide-ranging influence over the structures, policies, and operations of sheriff’s offices and library districts, an intergovernmental regime that does not resemble what the law imagines.
This Article draws upon hundreds of original primary sources to sketch the expansive power of county government against an era of unsettled institutional norms. It argues that counties demand new attention from residents, scholars, and policymakers. Given that they will continue to play critical roles in the sub-federal system, counties should be given formal powers that they currently lack. At the same time, however, they should also be subject to novel channels of oversight that do not currently exist. Such a blend—of equal parts empowerment and disempowerment—can promote public accountability while strengthening regional governance. These reforms can preserve a county’s important intermediary function, yet do so in a manner that recognizes rather than ignores the evolving intergovernmental norms against which counties and other bodies operate.